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The analysis of games and sports as complex systems can give insights into the dynamics of
human competition, and has been proven useful in soccer, basketball, and other professional sports.
In this paper we present a model for dodgeball, a popular sport in US schools, and analyze it
using an ordinary differential equation (ODE) compartmental model and stochastic agent-based
game simulations. The ODE model reveals a rich landscape with different game dynamics occurring
depending on the strategies used by the teams, which can in some cases be mapped to scenarios in
competitive species models. Stochastic agent-based game simulations confirm and complement the
predictions of the deterministic ODE models. In some scenarios, game victory can be interpreted as
a noise-driven escape from the basin of attraction of a stable fixed point, resulting in extremely long
games when the number of players is large. Using the ODE and agent-based models, we construct
a strategy to increase the probability of winning.
I. INTRODUCTION
Games and sports are emerging as a rich testbed to
study the dynamics of competition in a controlled envi-
ronment. Examples include the analysis of passing net-
works [1, 2] and entropy [3] in soccer games (see also
[4] for a discussion on data-driven tactical approaches),
scoring dynamics [5–7] and play-by-play modeling [8, 9]
in professional sports such as hockey, basketball, foot-
ball, and table tennis, penalty kicks in soccer games [10],
and serves in tennis matches [11]. Here we explore the
dynamics of dodgeball, where the number of players play-
ing different roles changes dynamically and ultimately
determines the outcome of the game. While modeling
dodgeball might seem like a very specific task, it is a rel-
atively clean and well-defined system where the ability of
mean-field techniques [12, 13] to describe human compe-
tition can be put to the test. In addition, it complements
ongoing efforts to quantify and model dynamics in sports
and games [1–11].
In this paper we present and analyze a mathematical
model of dodgeball based on both agent-based stochas-
tic game simulations and an ordinary differential equa-
tion (ODE) based compartmental model. By analyzing
the stability of fixed points of the ODE system, we find
that different game dynamics can occur depending on
the teams’ strategies: one of the teams achieves a quick
victory, either team can achieve a victory depending on
initial conditions, or the game evolves into a stalemate.
For the simplest strategy choice, these regimes can be in-
terpreted in the context of a competitive Lotka-Volterra
model. Numerical simulations of games based on stochas-
tic behavior of individual players reveal that the stale-
mate regime corresponds to extremely long games with
large fluctuations. These long games can be interpreted
∗ Perrin.Ruth@colorado.edu
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as a noise-driven escape from the basin of attraction of
the stable stalemate fixed point, and are commonly ob-
served in dodgeball games (see Fig. 2). Using both the
stochastic and ODE models, we develop a greedy strat-
egy and demonstrate it using stochastic simulations.
The structure for the paper is as follows. In Section
II we describe the rules of the game we will analyze. In
Section III we present and analyze a compartment-based
model of dodgeball. In Section IV we present stochastic
numerical simulations of dodgeball games and compare
these with the predictions of the compartmental model.
We then discuss the notion of strategy in the context of
this stochastic model. Finally, we present our conclusions
in Sec. V.
II. DESCRIPTION OF DODGEBALL
In this paper we consider the following variant played
often in elementary schools in the US (sometimes called
prison dodgeball). Two teams (Team 1 and Team 2) of
N players each initially occupy two zones adjacent to
each other, which we will refer to as Court 1 and CourtX1 X2 Y1Y2
Jail 1Jail 2 Court 1 Court 2
X1 X2 Y1Y2
Jail 1Jail 2 Court 1 Court 2
FIG. 1. (a) Setup of dodgeball court. Players in team i make
transitions between Court i and Jail i, and Team i loses when
there are no players in court i.
ar
X
iv
:2
00
8.
05
89
1v
1 
 [p
hy
sic
s.s
oc
-p
h]
  2
2 J
ul 
20
20
2FIG. 2. Evolution of two fifth-grade dodgeball games played
in Eisenhower Elementary in Boulder, Colorado, USA. The
number of players in Courts 1 and 2, X1 and X2, fluctuate
for a long time without any team gaining a decisive advantage.
The games were eventually stopped and a winner decided on
the spot.
2 (see Fig. 1). Players in a Court can throw balls at
players of the opposite team in the other Court. If a
player in a Court is hit by such a ball, they move to
their respective team’s Jail, an area behind the opposite
team’s Court. A player in a Court may also throw a ball
to a player of their own Team in their Jail, and if the
ball is caught, the catching player returns to their Team’s
Court. These processes are illustrated schematically in
Fig. 3. We denote the number of players on Team i that
are in Court i and Jail i by Xi and Yi, respectively. Team
i loses when Xi = 0. For simplicity, we assume there are
always available balls and neglect the possibility that a
player catches a ball thrown at them by an enemy player.
In practice, games often last a long time without any
of the Teams managing to send all the enemy players
to Jail. Because of this, such games are stopped at a
predetermined time and the winner is decided based on
other factors (e.g., which Team has more players on their
Court). An example of this is in Figure 2, which shows
the numbers of players in Courts 1 and 2, X1 and X2,
during two fifth-grade dodgeball games in Eisenhower El-
ementary in Boulder, Colorado. The values of X1 and X2
seem to fluctuate without any team obtaining decisive
advantage. The games continued after the time inter-
val shown and were eventually stopped. Our subsequent
model and analysis suggests that this stalemate behav-
ior is the result of underlying dynamics that has a stable
fixed point about which X1 and X2 fluctuate.
III. RATE EQUATION DESCRIPTION OF
GAME DYNAMICS
We begin our description of the game dynamics by
adopting a continuum formulation where the number of
players in Courts 1 and 2 are approximated by continuous
variables. These variables evolve following rate equations
obtained from the rates at which the processes described
in the previous section and illustrated in Fig. 3 occur.
Since the number of players in a dodgeball game is not
too large (typically less than 50), and the game is decided
when the number of players in a court drops to zero, one
might question the validity of a continuum description.
However, as we will see in Sec IV, stochastic simulations
with few players show that the rate equations give useful
insights about the dynamics of simulated games with a
finite number off players.
To construct the rate equations, we define λ as the
mean throw rate of the players. Consequently, team i
throws balls at a rate of λXi. We also define Fi(X1, X2)
as the fraction of balls that team i throws that are di-
rected at enemy players, pe(X) as the probability that a
ball thrown at X opposing players hits one of them, and
pj(Y ) as the probability that a ball thrown at Y players
in jail is caught. Combining these processes and using
Yi = N −Xi we get the Dodgeball Equations:
X˙1 = λX1[1− F1(X1, X2)]pj(N1 −X1)
− λX2F2(X1, X2)pe(X1),
(1)
X˙2 = λX2[1− F2(X1, X2)]pj(N2 −X2)
− λX1F1(X1, X2)pe(X2).
(2)
Note that, given the initial conditions Xi(0) = N ,
Xi(t) ∈ [0, N ] for all t ≥ 0. For simplicity, we as-
sume the functions pj and pe to be linear, pj(Y ) = kjY
and pe(X) = keX. Defining the normalized number of
Jail 1Jail 2 Court 1 Court 2 Jail 1Jail 2 Court 1 Court 2
Jail 1Jail 2 Court 1 Court 2 Jail 1Jail 2 Court 1 Court 2
FIG. 3. (Top) A player in a Court can be sent to Jail when
hit by a ball from a player in the opposing Court. (Bottom)
A player can be saved from Jail when catching a ball thrown
by a player from their Court.
3Symbol Meaning
ai Probability that a player in Team i tries to hit an
opponent instead of saving a teammate from jail
xi Fraction of players in Team i in Court i
c Probability of hitting/probability of saving
TABLE I. Notation used in the dodgeball model Equa-
tions (5)-(6).
players xi = Xi/N ∈ [0, 1] and the dimensionless time
τ = λNkjt, we get the simplified Dodgeball Equations:
dx1
dτ
= x1(1− x1)[1− f1(x1, x2)]− cx1x2f2(x1, x2), (3)
dx2
dτ
= x2(1− x2)[1− f2(x1, x2)]− cx1x2f1(x1, x2), (4)
where fi(x1, x2) = Fi(Nx1, Nx2) and c = ke/kj > 0 is
the effectiveness of throwing a ball at an enemy relative
to throwing a ball at jail.
A. Example: fixed strategy
As an illustrative example we will focus on the case
when the strategy for both teams is fixed over the course
of the game, fi(x1, x2) = ai ∈ (0, 1). We will consider
state-dependent choices for fi (i.e., strategies) in Sec. IV.
Inserting fi(x1, x2) = ai into Equations (3)-(4) gives
dx1
dτ
= x1(1− x1)(1− a1)− cx1x2a2, (5)
dx2
dτ
= x2(1− x2)(1− a2)− cx1x2a1, (6)
which is a 2-species competitive Lotka-Volterra system
[14]. In this case, we can use known results about this sys-
tem to understand the possible game scenarios. Specifi-
cally, at τ = 0 the system starts at (x1, x2) = (1, 1). For
τ > 0, the solution converges towards one of the stable
fixed points of (5)-(6) in the invariant square [0, 1]×[0, 1],
which are (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), and the solutions (x∗1, x
∗
2)
of the linear system
0 = (1− x1)(1− a1)− cx2a2, (7)
0 = (1− x2)(1− a2)− cx1a1. (8)
If a1a2c
2 6= (1− a1)(1− a2) there is a unique solution to
these equations, the fixed point
x∗1 =
(1− a2)[a2c− (1− a1)]
a1a2c2 − (1− a1)(1− a2) , (9)
x∗2 =
(1− a1)[a1c− (1− a2)]
a1a2c2 − (1− a1)(1− a2) . (10)
The degenerate case where a1a2c
2 = (1−a1)(1−a2) gives
a continuum of fixed points described by
x∗1 + x
∗
2 = 1, (11)
0.0 1.0
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FIG. 4. Stream plots of Equations (5-6) with c = 0.5 and
various values of a1 and a2. (Top left) Stalemate: for a1 =
1/4, a2 = 3/4, both (0, 1) and (1, 0) are unstable and (x
∗
1, x
∗
2)
is stable. (Top right) Team 1 wins: for for a1 = 9/16, a2 =
3/4, (1, 0) is a stable fixed point while (0, 1) is unstable, giving
Team 1 the advantage; note that in this case (x∗1, x
∗
2) /∈ [0, 1]2.
(Bottom left) Competitive: for a1 = 7/8, a2 = 3/4, both (0, 1)
and (1, 0) are stable fixed points, and the winner is determined
by the initial conditions. (Bottom right) Degenerate: For the
special case a1 = a2 = (1 + c)
−1, every point on the line
x1 + x2 = 1 is a fixed point.
when a1 = (1−a2)/c and a2 = (1−a1)/c, and no solution
otherwise.
The fixed point (0, 0) corresponds to both teams run-
ning out of players, the fixed points (1, 0) and (0, 1) corre-
spond to Team 1 and Team 2 winning, respectively, and
the fixed point (x∗1, x
∗
2), when it is stable and in (0, 1)
2,
corresponds to a stalemate situation where the number
of players in each court remains constant in time. By an-
alyzing the linear stability of the fixed points (see, e.g.,
[14]), one finds that the game dynamics can be classified
in the following cases:
• Stalemate. This occurs when (0, 1), (1, 0) are both
unstable and (x∗1, x
∗
2) is in [0, 1]
2 and is stable,
which occurs when a1 < (1 − a2)/c and a2 <
(1 − a1)/c. In this scenario, the solution settles
in the fixed point (x∗1, x
∗
2) and no Team wins in the
deterministic version of the game. The flow corre-
sponding to this case is shown in Fig. 4 (top left).
This scenario is analogous to the “Stable coexis-
tence” of species in the Lotka-Volterra model.
• Competitive. This occurs when (0, 1), (1, 0) are sta-
ble and the fixed point (x∗1, x
∗
2) is in [0, 1]
2 and is
unstable, which occurs when a1 > (1 − a2)/c and
4a2 > (1−a1)/c. The stable manifold of (x∗1, x∗2) acts
as a separatrix for the basins of attraction of the
fixed points that correspond to victories for Team
1 and Team 2. See Fig. 4 (bottom left). This sce-
nario is analogous to the “Unstable coexistence” of
species in the Lotka-Volterra model.
• Team 1 wins. This occurs when (0, 1) is unsta-
ble and (1, 0) is stable, which occurs when a1 >
(1 − a2)/c and a2 < (1 − a1)/c. In this scenario,
the solution converges towards a victory by Team
1. See Fig. 4 (top right). This scenario is analo-
gous to the “Competitive exclusion” of species in
the Lotka-Volterra model, in which one species is
driven to extinction by the other.
• Team 2 wins. This occurs when (0, 1) is stable and
(1, 0) is unstable, and is analogous to the Team 1
wins case. In this scenario, the solution converges
towards a victory by Team 2.
• Degenerate. This occurs when there is a continuum
of fixed points x∗1 + x
∗
2 = 1. In this scenario, the
solution converges towards the line x1+x2 = 1, and
no winner is produced in the deterministic version
of the game. See Fig. 4 (bottom right).
Figure 4 illustrates these different game dynamics by
showing the flow induced by Eqs. (5)-(6) in the region
0 ≤ x1 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ x2 ≤ 1 for various parameter choices.
Stable fixed points are shown as red circles, and unstable
fixed points as yellow circles.
In Figure 5 we illustrate how the game outcome de-
pends on the strategies used by both teams. The cases
c > 1 and c < 1 are illustrated in Figs. 5 (a) and (b),
respectively. The strategy phase space (a1, a2) is divided
into four regions separated by the lines a1 = (1 − a2)/c
and a2 = (1−a1)/c. When both teams preferentially save
players of their own team from jail, instead of trying to
hit players from the other team (i.e., both a1 and a2 are
small), the game results in a stalemate (we reiterate that
when stochasticity is included, this scenario corresponds
a1 a1a1
a 2a 2a 2
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CompetitiveCompetitive
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a2 = (1 −
a1 )/c
a2 = (1 − a1 )/c
a1 = (1 −
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a2 )/c
a1 a1 11 00
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1
0
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1
0
Competitive
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(a) c = 2/3 (b) c = 3/2
FIG. 5. Deterministic game outcomes based on different
strategies (a1, a2) for (a) c < 1, (b) c > 1.
to long games). When both teams preferentially hit play-
ers from the other team (i.e., bot a1 and a2 are close to
1) a winner emerges quickly. When teams have opposite
strategies, one of the teams can quickly win, depending
on the value of c.
While the rate equation description provides interest-
ing insights, it relies on the assumption of an infinite
number of players. Because of this, some of its predic-
tions are not reasonable for games with a finite number
of players. For example, it predicts that the outcome
of games is completely determined by parameters and
initial conditions. In reality, games are determined by
the aggregate behavior of a finite number of individual
players, and chance can play an important role. In the
next section we will model dodgeball games by consider-
ing the stochastic behavior of individual players, and we
will find that the insights provided by the rate equations
are useful to understand the stochastic dodgeball games.
IV. STOCHASTIC DODGEBALL SIMULATIONS
In this Section we present numerical simulations of
dodgeball games using a stochastic agent-based model
that corresponds to the simplified model used in Sec-
tion III.
In the stochastic version of the game, each team
starts with N players in their respective court, X1(0) =
X2(0) = N , and no players in Jail, Y1(0) = Y2(0) = 0.
Players in Court 1 make stochastic transitions to Jail 1 at
rate λX2(t)F2(X1, X2)keX1, and players in Jail 1 make
X1 X2 Y1Y2
cF2X1X2
X1(N − X1)(1 − F1)
cF1X1X2
X2(N − X2)(1 − F2)
Jail 1Jail 2 Court 1 Court 2
FIG. 6. Stochastic dodgeball game. Players make transitions
between the indicated compartments with the rates shown
next to the arrows. The game ends when either X1 = 0 or
X2 = 0.
5FIG. 7. Simulations of games with the same constants as
Fig. 4. Trajectories (X1, X2) have stochastic fluctuations on
top of the deterministic flow of Fig 4. The “Stalemate” regime
(top left) results in long, back-and-forth games.
transitions to Court 1 at rate λX1[1−F1(X1, X2)]kj(N−
X1), where, as in Sec. III, Fi(X1, X2) is the probabil-
ity that a player in Court i will throw a ball towards
an enemy player in the opposite Court instead of try-
ing to save a teammate from Jail, ke is the probability
of hitting a single enemy player, and kj is the prob-
ability that a player in Jail catches a ball thrown at
them. The rates of transition for players in Team 2
are obtained by permuting the indices 1 and 2. By
using the dimensionless time τ = λkjt, the rates of
transition per dimensionless time are cX1X2F2(X1, X2)
and X1(N − X1)[1 − F1(X1, X2)] for players to transi-
tion from Court 1 to Jail 1 and from Jail 1 to Court
1, respectively, where c = ke/kj . The compartmental
model corresponding to this process is shown schemati-
cally in Fig. 6. The code used for simulating the agent-
based dodgeball model and finding the probability that
a team wins can be found on the GitHub repository
(https://github.com/Dodgeball-code/Dodgeball).
A. Stochastic games
In Figure 7 we show the evolution of four dodgeball
games simulated as described above using the same pa-
rameters as in Fig. 4. The plots show the trajecto-
ries of (X1, X2) starting from initial conditions (50, 50).
FIG. 8. Fraction of players in Courts 1 and 2 (solid lines)
versus dimensionless time τ for a stochastic game simulation
with the same parameters as Fig 4 (top left), i.e., c = 1/2,
a1 = 1/4, a2 = 3/4, and N = 50. In the “Stalemate” regime,
the fraction of players fluctuates stochastically about the fixed
point values x∗1 = x
∗
2 (dashed line).
Note that, although the trajectories have significant fluc-
tuations, they follow approximately the flow shown in
Fig. 4. In particular, for the parameters resulting in the
stalemate scenario [i.e., a stable fixed point (x∗1, x
∗
2) ∈
(0, 1) × (0, 1)] the number of players in Courts 1 and 2
fluctuates around (Nx∗1, Nx
∗
2) (indicated with an arrow).
In practice, these parameters result in extremely long
games that continue until a random fluctuation is large
enough to decrease X1 or X2 to zero. To further illus-
trate this, Fig. 8 shows X1(t) (blue) and X2(t) (orange)
as a function of t for the parameters in Fig. 4(a). The
evolution of this game resembles that of the games seen
in Fig. 2, which suggests that those games were in the
Stalemate regime. In the degenerate case, Fig. 4(d), the
game trajectory has large fluctuations around the line
X1 + X2 = N , which corresponds to the line of fixed
points x∗1 + x
∗
2 = 1 of the deterministic system. We in-
terpret this behavior as the trajectory diffusing under
the effect of the fluctuations along the marginally stable
line X1 +X2 = N . Note that in the particular trajectory
shown, Team 1 wins even after at some point in time they
had only one player in Court 1. In Fig. 7(c) the game
eventually results in a victory by Team 1, even though
the deterministic model predicts a victory by Team 2
[see Fig. 4(c)], because stochastic fluctuations of the
trajectory (X1, X2) allow it to cross over to the basin
of attraction of (1, 0).
As we see from these examples, the outcome of stochas-
tic dodgeball games is determined both by the underlying
deterministic flow and by the stochastic fluctuations of
the (X1, X2) trajectories. To account for this, we focus
on how the probability P of winning a game depends on
the parameters. This probability can be calculated di-
rectly from the outcomes of a large number of simulated
games (the algorithm for simulating games is presented
6FIG. 9. (a) Probability that Team 1 wins a game P1 as a
function of a1 with c = 2/3 and a2 = 3/4 for N = 1, 5, 10, 20,
and 50 (blue, orange, yellow, purple, and green solid lines,
respectively). The dashed red lines mark bifurcations in the
deterministic dynamics (see text), and the dashed horizontal
line indicates P1 = 1/2. The leftmost region corresponds to
the “Stalemate” regime leading to long games. The middle
region represents “Team 1 Wins”, which can be noted by the
large values of P1 for large values of N . The right region is
the “Competitive” region in the deterministic model noted by
mixed values of P1 and quicker games. (b) Average duration
of games (in dimensionless time τ) with the same parameters
as in the bottom panel. The duration of games in the “Stale-
mate” regime increases with N . The shaded area around the
green curve represents 3 standard deviations.
in Appendix A 1, but it is much more efficiently calcu-
lated by using the properties of the underlying Markov
process, as explained in Appendix A 2. To illustrate how
the probability of winning can be related to the deter-
ministic results, we fix c = 2/3 and a2 = 3/4, and cal-
culate P1 as a function of a1. Fig 9(a) shows P1 as a
function of a1 for N = 1, 5, 10, 20, and 50 (blue, orange,
yellow, purple, and green solid lines, respectively). As a1
increases from 0 to 1, different regimes of the determin-
istic model are traversed. For the parameters given let
as = (1− a2)/c = 3/8 and ac = 1− a2c = 1/2, which are
shown as dashed red lines. For 0 ≤ a1 < as, the system
is in the “Stalemate” case, for as < a1 < ac the system is
the “Team 1 Wins” case, and for ac < a1 < 1, it is in the
“Competitive” case. Now we interpret how P1 changes as
a1 is increased. For a1 < 1− a2, the fixed point (x∗1, x∗2)
is closer to (0, 1) than it is to (1, 0), and since victory is
achieved by escaping the basin of attraction of the fixed
point with random fluctuations, it is much more likely
that this escape will occur to the nearest fixed point, in
this case (0, 1). Therefore, P1 ∼ 0 in this regime, and it
is smaller for larger N since fluctuations are smaller. For
1−a2 < a1 < as, the game is still in the stalemate regime,
but now (x∗1, x
∗
2) is closer to (1, 0) and therefore P1 ∼ 1,
and increases with N . For as < a1 < ac, the game is
in the “Team 1 Wins” regime, and so P1 approaches 1
rapidly as N increases. For a1 > ac, the game is in the
“Competitive” regime, where the initial condition (1, 1)
is in the basin of attraction of (1, 0) for a1 < a2 and in the
basin of attraction of (0, 1) for a1 > a2, which is reflected
by the fact that P1 > 1/2 for a1 < a2 and P1 < 1/2 for
a2 < a1. We note that for very small N (e.g., N = 1, 5),
the predictions of the deterministic theory break down.
This can be understood in the limiting case N = 1 (blue
curve), where the probability of winning can be calcu-
lated explicitly as P1 = a1/(a1 + a2) = 4a1/(4a1 + 3).
According to our interpretation, victory in the “Stale-
mate” regime is achieved by escaping the basin of attrac-
tion of the underlying stable fixed point (x∗1, x
∗
2) via fluc-
tuations induced by the finite number of players. Since
these fluctuations become less important as the number
of players increases, one would expect that the average
time τ to achieve victory would (i) be largest in the
“Stalemate” regime, and (ii) increase with N . Fig 9(b)
shows the average game duration τ as a function of
a1, calculated from direct simulation of 5000 stochastic
games when N < 50 and 100 games when N = 50. Con-
sistent with the interpretation above, τ is much longer in
the “Stalemate” regime and increases with N [we have
found that τ scales exponentially with N (not shown), as
one would expect for an escape problem driven by finite
size fluctuations]. Furthermore, it is maximum approx-
imately when (x∗1, x
∗
2) is equidistant to (0, 1) and (1, 0),
i.e., when a1 = 1− a2 [see Fig 9(a)].
To get a broader picture of how the choice of fixed
strategies a1, a2 affects the probability of winning, we
show in Fig. 10 the probability that Team 1 wins, P1, as
a function of a1 and a2, obtained numerically as described
in Appendix A 2 for N = 20 and the same parameters of
Fig. 5(a). The curve for N = 20 in Fig. 9(a) corresponds
to the values shown in the dashed line. There appears to
be a saddle point approximately at (a1, a2) ≈ (1/2, 1/2)
corresponding to a Nash equilibrium, i.e., a set of strate-
gies such that neither Team would benefit from a change
of strategy if the other Team maintains their strategy.
The issue of the appropriate definition and existence of
Nash equilibria in finite-player stochastic games and their
behavior as the number of players tends to infinity has
been studied in the emerging area of mean-field games
[12, 13]. We leave a more detailed study of Nash equilib-
ria in dodgeball for future study.
B. Heuristic Strategy
In the example treated in the previous Sections, the
probability that a player in Team i decides to throw a
ball to an enemy player instead of rescuing a teammate
7FIG. 10. Probability that Team 1 wins P1 as a function of a1
and a2. The dashed line corresponds to the N = 20 curve in
Fig. 9(a).
from jail, Fi(X1, X2) is fixed throughout the game at the
value ai. In reality, players may adjust this probability
in order to optimize the probability of winning. In this
Section we will develop a heuristic greedy strategy with
the goal of trying to optimize victory. For this purpose,
it is useful to define the quantities Hi as
H1 =
X1
X1+X2
, H2 =
X2
X1+X2
. (12)
These quantities have the advantage that they are nor-
malized between 0 and 1, with Hi = 0 (Hi = 1) corre-
sponding to a loss (victory) by Team i. In addition, Hi
corresponds to the probability that team i will throw a
ball next, and therefore it is a good indicator of how much
control team i has. Therefore, it is reasonable for Team
i to apply a strategy to increase Hi. To develop such a
strategy, we define Hi and H
+
i as the values of Hi before
and after a ball is thrown. Similarly, we define Xi and
X+i as the values of Xi before and after a ball is thrown.
For definiteness, we will present the strategy for Team 1,
and the strategy for Team 2 will be similar. The basis
of the strategy is to choose the value of F1(X1, X2) that
maximizes the expected value of H+1 , E[H
+
1 ]. Since F1 is
the probability that the ball is thrown at enemy players,
pe the probability that such a ball actually hits an enemy
player, 1−F1 the probability that the ball is thrown at a
teammate in jail, and pj the probability that such a ball
is successful in rescuing a teammate, the expected value
of H+1 is given by
E[H+1 ] = F1
[
X1
X1 +X2 − 1pe +
X1
X1 +X2
(1− pe)
]
+ (1− F1)
[
X1 + 1
X1 +X2 + 1
pj +
X1
X1 +X2
(1− pj)
]
, (13)
Which can be rewritten as
E[H+1 ] = A+
B
X1 +X2
F1, (14)
FIG. 11. Probability of Team 1 winning with the heuristic
strategy F1 against a fixed strategy a2. Number of players in
each game is set to N = 20.
where
B =
[
Xt1
Xt1 +X
t
2 − 1
pe − X
t
2
Xt1 +X
t
2 + 1
pj
]
(15)
and A is independent of F1.
Since Eq. (14) is linear in F1, it is maximized by choos-
ing F1 = 1 when B > 0 and F1 = 0 when B < 0. There-
fore, the choice of F1 that maximizes the expected value
of H+1 , F
∗
1 , is
F ∗1 =
{
1, X1X1+X2−1pe(X2) ≥ X2X1+X2+1pj(N −X1),
0, otherwise.
(16)
When X1, X2  1, the strategy simplifies to
F ∗1 ≈
{
1, X1pe(X2) ≥ X2pj(N −X1),
0, otherwise.
(17)
We note that this can also be derived by maximizing
dH1/dt by using Eqs. (3)-(4). Furthermore, for the case
considered in Sections III and IV, where pe(Xi) = keXi
and pj(Yi) = kjYi, the strategy reduces to
F ∗1 =
{
1, keX1 ≥ kj(N −X1),
0, otherwise.
(18)
For example, when ke = kj (i.e., the probability of suc-
cess in hitting an enemy player is the same as the prob-
ability of succeeding in rescuing a teammate from jail)
the strategy for Team 1 consists in trying always to res-
cue teammates from Jail 1 when the majority of Team 1
player’s are in Jail 1, and in trying to hit players from
Team 2 when the majority of Team 1’s players are in
Court 1. Interestingly, in the limit X1, X2  1 the
strategy for Team 1 is independent of X2.
To validate the effectiveness of this strategy, we simu-
late dodgeball games in which Team 1 adopts the strategy
8F1(X1, X2) = F
∗
1 given by Eq. (16) and Team 2 uses the
fixed strategy F2(X1, X2) = a2. In Fig. 11 we plot the
probability that Team 1 wins, P1, as a function of a2 for
c = 2/3, 1, 3/2, and ∞ (blue, orange, yellow, and purple
solid lines, respectively). As the Figure shows, using the
Strategy F ∗1 consistently results in a probability of win-
ning higher than 1/2. In general, the strategy F ∗1 does
best when c is small and N is large. Note the probabil-
ity of Team 1 winning is 1/2 only when c = ∞, i.e., the
chance of saving a player in jail is 0. In this case the
strategy a2 = 1 is clearly optimal.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we presented a mathematical model
of dodgeball, which we analyzed via an ODE-based
compartmental model and numerical simulations of a
stochastic agent-based model. These two complementary
methods of analysis revealed a rich dynamical landscape.
Depending on Teams’ strategies, the dynamics and out-
come of the game is determined by a combination of the
stability of the fixed points of the underlying dynami-
cal system and the stochastic fluctuations caused by the
random behavior of individual players. Additionally, we
derived a greedy strategy in the context of the stochas-
tic model of dodgeball. While our strategy was shown
to be effective against fixed strategies (i.e., F2 = a2), it
isn’t necessarily optimal. This suggests the future work
of finding an optimal strategy as well as studying the
topic of Nash equilibriums in the context of dodgeball.
More data is needed to verify some of the predictions
of the dodgeball model. While the time series from real
games shown in Fig. 2 appear to be consistent with the
Stalemate regime, a quantitative comparison would need
estimation of the quantities ke, kj , a1, and a2. In princi-
ple, these probabilities could be estimated from recorded
dodgeball games. Nevertheless, the continuous model of
dodgeball is able to offer reasonable insights into the be-
havior of stochastic agent-based games with a realistic
number of players.
Our model and analysis relied on various assumptions
and simplifications, and relaxing some of these assump-
tions could be a useful topic for future work as well. One
significant assumption used is that a ball thrown at an
enemy player will not be caught. However, it is possi-
ble for balls to be caught, and this causes the thrower to
be sent to jail. The dodgeball model could be extended
to include this situation. Who a player decides to tar-
get currently only depends on the number of remaining
enemies in play and the number of people in jail, but
this could be generalized to account for heterogeneous
targeting probabilities. The last assumption that will be
discussed here is that this model assumes uniform be-
havior of the players. Individual ability could be mod-
eled by including an individual’s ability to catch balls,
hit an enemy target, and hit shots on jail. Finally, we
assumed that players behave independently (which is a
reasonable approximation in Elementary School games).
Coordinated strategies such as those used in professional
games are not considered here.
Appendix A
In this Appendix we provide details about the numeri-
cal simulation of the stochastic dodgeball games, and the
numerical computation of winning probabilities Pi.
1. Agent-based stochastic simulations
Here we describe the simulation of a single, stochastic
agent-based dodgeball game. At t = 0, the game starts
with N players on each team, X1 = X2 = N . Since λ
is the rate at which players throw balls, and we assume
that players throw balls independently of each other, the
next ball throw in the game is exponentially distributed
with rate
r = (X1 +X2)λ. (A1)
The probability that team i throws a ball next (before
the other team), which we denote pi, is given by
p1 =
X1
X1 +X2
, (A2)
p2 =
X2
X1 +X2
. (A3)
The pseudo-code for simulating a game is below. Recall
that Fi(X1, X2) is the probability that team i throws a
ball towards the enemy instead of towards their jail, pe
is the probability that a ball thrown towards the enemy
hits a target, and pj is the probability that a ball thrown
towards jail is successfully caught. In addition, we stop
the simulation if the number of throws k exceeds Kmax =
50N2.
Algorithm 1 Simulate dodgeball game
At t = 0, set X1 = X2 = N and k = 0.
while (X1 > 0 and X2 > 0) and k ≤ Kmax do
k ← k + 1
t← t + Exponential random variable with mean 1/r.
Choose throwing team, 1 or 2, with probabilities p1, p2.
Let the throwing team be i and the other team be j.
Choose to throw ball at enemy or rescue from jail
with probabilities Fi(X1, X2), 1− Fi(X1, X2).
if Throw to enemy then
Xj ← Xj − 1 with probability pe(Xj)
end if
if Throw to jail then
Xi ← Xi + 1 with probability pj(N −Xi)
end if
end while
92. Calculation of winning probabilities Pi
Here we explain how the probability that team i wins,
Pi, is calculated for a given set of parameters.
First, we define as ~vk the column vector whose entries
are the probabilities that the game is in each of the (N +
1)2 possible states (X1, X2) after the k-th ball is thrown.
Accordingly, ~v0 is the vector that represents the initial
condition (N,N). Then, we define M as the (N + 1)2 ×
(N + 1)2 matrix of transition probabilities between these
states. Because the game is a Markov process, we have
~vk+1 = M~vk. (A4)
Now we let ~ui be a vector that is 1 in each state in which
Team i wins and 0 otherwise. Then,
Pi = lim
k→∞
~vTk ~ui (A5)
In practice, we stop the iteration when
|P1 + P2 − 1| = |~vk · (~u1 + ~u2)− 1| < 10−4, (A6)
or k > Kmax = 50N
2. When the game is in stalemate,
the expected length of games grows exponentially with
N , and the calculation above becomes impractical for
moderate values of N . In this case, we instead evolve the
vector ~vk in steps that are powers of two, as
~v2j = M
2j~v0 = (M
2j−1)2~v0, (A7)
In practice we stop this iteration when j > Jmax = 256.
The iteration described by Eq. A7 uses repeated non-
sparse matrix multiplications, while Eq. A4 uses faster
sparse matrix-vector products. However, since games can
be extremely long in the stalemate regime, the method
described by Eq. A7 is still faster in that regime. We
choose the values Jmax and Kmax such that in practice
Eq. A4 and Eq. A7 take similar amounts of time in the
stalemate regime.
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